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THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GERRYMANDERING
NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, scholars have made great strides in measuring the
extent of partisan gerrymandering. By and large, though, they have
not yet tried to answer the questions that logically come next: What
are the causes of district plans’ partisan skews? And what conse-
quences do these skews have for democratic values? Using a unique
dataset of state house and congressional plans’ partisan tilts from
1972 to 2016, this Article addresses precisely these issues. It finds
that single-party control of the redistricting process dramatically
benefits the party in charge, while other mapmaking configurations
have small and inconsistent effects. It also shows that greater Black
representation and greater urbanization have a modest pro-Republi-
can impact, albeit one that fades when Democrats are responsible for
redistricting. It concludes as well that the harm of gerrymandering
is not limited to divergences between parties’ seat and vote shares.
The injury extends, rather, to the distortion of the representation that
legislators provide to their constituents.
* Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of
Chicago Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, some of the most important questions about
partisan gerrymandering have been answered. How should we
measure the extent to which a district plan benefits (or disadvan-
tages) a party? Scholars have introduced metrics, like the efficiency
gap1 and partisan bias,2 that are easy to calculate and so intuitive
that courts have begun relying on them.3 What does the distribution
of plans’ partisan fairness look like? Based on historical data span-
ning several decades, the distribution is centered on zero (or no edge
for either party) and normal in shape.4 And how have plans’ parti-
san skews changed over time? In earlier periods, maps tended to
assist Democrats, while over the last couple decades, they have
tilted ever further in a Republican direction.5
Despite this progress, there is still much that we do not know,
especially about the causes and consequences of partisan gerryman-
dering. By causes I mean all of the factors that may affect a district
plan’s partisan fairness. One set of these factors relates to the
institution responsible for redistricting. We might hypothesize (in
the absence of reliable evidence) that when a party has full control
of the line-drawing process, the resulting map is usually skewed in
its favor. Conversely, we might expect that when control of the state
government is divided—or when a commission or court crafts the
boundaries—the ensuing plan is comparatively neutral.
A second set of factors involves minority representation. A com-
mon argument is that Republicans profit as more districts are
drawn in which minority voters are able to elect their preferred
candidates. The logic is that these districts tend to elect Democratic
candidates by overwhelming margins. The districts therefore waste
1. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 849-55 (2015).
2. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994).
3. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (discussing partisan
bias); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 903-10 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court)
(discussing the efficiency gap), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
4. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 870 fig.4.
5. See id. at 873 figs.5 & 6.
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large numbers of Democratic votes, enabling Republican candidates
to win more of a plan’s remaining seats.
A final concept that is often linked to partisan fairness is political
geography. Here the typical claim is that Democratic voters are
heavily concentrated in urban areas while Republican voters are
more efficiently distributed in suburban, exurban, and rural re-
gions. Accordingly, Democrats are “naturally” packed in a small
number of districts, allowing Republicans to win more seats (by
slimmer margins) thanks to their superior spatial allocation.
Turning to the consequences of partisan gerrymandering, the
most salient is how legislators represent their constituents. The
voting records of Democratic and Republican legislators, of course,
are almost always different. Most Democrats take more liberal posi-
tions while most Republicans adopt more conservative stances.6 A
reasonable hypothesis, then, is that as a district plan skews further
in a Democratic (Republican) direction, the ideological midpoint of
the legislature becomes more liberal (conservative)—even keeping
constant the preferences of the electorate. Electing more of a party’s
members for the same share of the statewide vote may be expected
to yield ideological dividends.
These causes and consequences, it is worth emphasizing, are of
more than academic interest. If contemporary maps tend to benefit
Republicans, for instance, but this edge is due to compliance with
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) or the country’s political geography,
then there may be little that can or should be done about the
imbalance. On the other hand, if Republicans owe much of their
advantage to control of the mapmaking process, then the case for
intervention, judicial or political, becomes stronger. Similarly, we
might not be too concerned about partisan gerrymandering if its
damage is limited to bloodless concepts like seat and vote shares.
But if gerrymandering distorts legislative representation—the beat-
ing heart of a democracy—then there may be more cause for alarm.
In this Article, I tackle these issues using a unique dataset of
state house and congressional plans’ efficiency gaps from 1972 to
2016. (The efficiency gap is a measure of partisan fairness that
captures in a single number how much more “cracked” and “packed”
6. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.ORG, http://voteview.org/
political_polarization_2015.htm [https://perma.cc/PHP2-5DGJ].
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one party’s supporters are than the other party’s backers.)7 I pair
this dataset with information on the institution responsible for
designing each plan, Black and Latino representation, the level of
urbanization, and the ideologies of members of Congress. I also em-
ploy rigorous techniques, like fixed effects regression and nearest-
neighbor matching, to come as close as is possible to establishing
causation in a nonexperimental setting.
I find, first, that unified control of the redistricting process pro-
duces a large and statistically significant shift in the efficiency gap
in the direction of the party in charge. This result holds at both the
state house and the congressional level. The benefit of unified con-
trol has also increased in the last two decades. However, other re-
districting institutions have small and inconsistent effects on the
efficiency gap. That is, neither party consistently gains from plans
designed by courts, commissions, or divided governments.
 Second, I show that greater Black representation moves the
efficiency gap in a Republican direction while greater Latino repre-
sentation does not. This result also applies to both state house and
congressional plans. The pro-Republican shift in the efficiency gap
due to greater Black representation, though, is substantively quite
small. And the shift does not occur at all when Democrats are
responsible for redistricting. The relationship between Black repre-
sentation and partisan fairness is therefore contingent, not compul-
sory.
Third, there is a link between urbanization and the efficiency gap
in state house plans but not in congressional plans. At the state
house level, Democrats tend to perform somewhat better in less ur-
banized states, while Republicans usually enjoy a modest advantage
in more urbanized states. Interestingly, this link persists no matter
which party is in charge of redistricting. It thus seems to be an
intrinsic feature of contemporary state house maps (albeit one
whose magnitude should not be overstated).
Lastly, the efficiency gap has a statistically and substantively
significant impact on the ideological midpoint of a congressional
delegation. In fact, a large pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) efficien-
cy gap, on the order of 10 percentage points, results in a liberal
7. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 849-50.
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(conservative) shift in a delegation’s ideological median of about half
a standard deviation. Moving from a gerrymander favoring one
party to a gerrymander aiding its adversary swings a delegation’s
ideological median by almost a full standard deviation—all without
changing the mind of a single voter.
These findings support two main conclusions. The first is that
partisan intent is the most potent driver of district plans’ partisan
fairness (or lack thereof). The deliberate manipulation of district
lines by a party in unified control of the state government consist-
ently affects the efficiency gap more than any other factor. Com-
pared to full control of the redistricting process, other institutional
arrangements, minority representation, and political geography pale
in their influence.
The second conclusion is that partisan gerrymandering dramati-
cally distorts congressional representation. Pro-Democratic gerry-
manders make House delegations substantially more liberal than
their states’ electorates. Pro-Republican gerrymanders have an even
larger effect in the opposite direction. The harm of gerrymandering
is thus more than seat shares that are out of whack with vote
shares. It is the ideological skewing of representation—and, with it,
the policies that shape people’s lives.
I begin this Article by surveying the limited existing literature on
the causes and consequences of partisan gerrymandering, using it
to generate a series of testable hypotheses. Next, I describe the data
and methods that I employ in my analysis. In the core of the Article,
I then explore how redistricting institutions, minority representa-
tion, and political geography are related to partisan fairness; and
how partisan fairness is related to congressional representation.
Lastly, I comment briefly on the implications of my results for the
legal and political debates over gerrymandering.
I. HYPOTHESES
As noted at the outset, political scientists have developed several
quantitative measures of district plans’ partisan fairness, the best
known of which are partisan bias and the efficiency gap. The older
of these metrics, partisan bias, is the difference between a party’s
seat share and 50% in a hypothetical, perfectly tied election.
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Suppose, for instance, that a party receives 60% of the vote and 70%
of the seats in an election. Suppose also that if the election had
ended in a tie, the party would have received 55% of the seats. Then
the plan’s partisan bias in that election is 5%: 55% minus 50%.8
The newer metric, the efficiency gap, is rooted in the insight that
partisan gerrymandering is always carried out in one of two ways:
the cracking of a party’s supporters among many districts, in which
their preferred candidates lose by relatively narrow margins; or the
packing of a party’s backers in a few districts, in which their pre-
ferred candidates win by overwhelming margins. Both cracking and
packing produce what are known as wasted votes because they do
not contribute to a candidate’s victory. In the case of cracking, all
votes cast for the losing candidate are wasted; in the case of
packing, all votes cast for the winning candidate, above the 50%
(plus 1) threshold needed for victory, are wasted. The efficiency gap
is simply one party’s total wasted votes in an election, minus the
other party’s total wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes
cast. It captures in a single number all of the cracking and packing
choices that go into a district plan, and reveals which party is ad-
vantaged by the plan and to what extent.9
Unfortunately, political scientists have devoted more effort to
measuring partisan gerrymandering than to studying its causes
and consequences. Starting with its causes, perhaps the most intu-
itive explanation for a map’s partisan skew is the institution respon-
sible for designing the map. When a single party fully controls the
state government at the time of redistricting, that party typically
has both the motive and the opportunity to enact a plan that
benefits it and disadvantages its opponent. Assuming competence
on the part of mapmakers, we may therefore hypothesize that
8. See generally, e.g., ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA: THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY 56-96 (2016); Gelman & King, supra note 2, at 543; Bernard Grofman & Gary King,
The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After
LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6-13 (2007). The party’s seat share in the counterfactual
tied election (here, 55%) is computed by assuming that every district in the plan swings by
the same amount (here, 10%) that is necessary to bring the statewide vote to exactly 50%. See
Grofman & King, supra, at 11-13.
9. See generally, e.g., Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District
Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 68-70 (2014); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note
1, at 849-55.
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unified control of the state government produces a partisan tilt in
favor of the party in charge. On the other hand, other redistricting
institutions—like bipartisan commissions, courts required to replace
unlawful plans, and state governments where control is divided—
have no obvious reason to favor either party. These institutions may
inadvertently craft unbalanced maps at times, but we should not
expect their handiwork to be systematically biased in either a
Democratic or a Republican direction.
The available literature mostly confirms this reasoning with
respect to unified control of the state government. Though they did
not control for any other variables, Richard Niemi and Simon Jack-
man found that state house plans designed entirely by Democrats
from 1970 to 1986 had an average pro-Democratic partisan bias of
4.1%, while wholly Republican-drafted maps had an average pro-
Republican bias of 4.5%.10 Similarly, using a model that incorpo-
rated lagged bias and whether a plan was redrawn in a given year,
Andrew Gelman and Gary King showed that unified partisan
control produced a 3 percentage point swing in bias in a party’s
favor in state house elections from 1968 to 1988.11 At the congressio-
nal level, Janet Campagna and Bernard Grofman did not detect
significant differences in bias between Democratic- and Republican-
controlled states in 1980 and 1982.12 But using a cross-sectional
model that also took into account minority population and urbaniza-
tion, Nicholas Geodert determined that, in 2012, Democratic control
shifted the efficiency gap by 17 percentage points in a Democratic
direction, while Republican control shifted it by 14 points in a Re-
publican direction.13
10. See Richard G. Niemi & Simon Jackman, Bias and Responsiveness in State Legislative
Districting, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 183, 195 tbl.4 (1991).
11. See Gelman & King, supra note 2, at 553. Note that this is the swing relative to a
bipartisan plan; the swing is twice as large relative to a plan designed by the opposite party.
See id.
12. See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POLITICS 1242, 1251-53, 1252 tbl.3 (1990).
13. See Nicholas Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography? How Democrats Won the Popu-
lar Vote but Lost the Congress in 2012, RES. & POL., Apr.-June 2014, at 1, 6 tbl.2 [hereinafter
Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?] (using a metric closely related, but not identical, to
the efficiency gap); see also Nicholas Goedert, The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014
Update to the “Gerrymandering or Geography” Debate, RES. & POL., Oct.-Dec. 2015, at 1, 5
tbl.3 [hereinafter Goedert, Disappearing Bias] (reporting a pro-Democratic boost of 11
percentage points, and a pro-Republican boost of 13 percentage points, in the 2014 election).
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With respect to other redistricting institutions, I am unaware of
any work that analyzes their effect on the direction of maps’
partisan skew. However, Bruce Cain and his coauthors found that,
in 2002, state house plans designed by commissions had an average
absolute partisan bias of 4.0%, compared to 11.7% for maps crafted
by legislatures.14 Likewise, in an earlier article, I used fixed effects
models to examine how commission usage, court usage, and divided
government influenced the magnitude of the efficiency gap in state
house and congressional elections from 1972 to 2012.15 I concluded
that all of these institutions reduced its size somewhat, with the
impact most pronounced for divided government.16
The next factor that is often linked to partisan fairness is mi-
nority representation. In certain circumstances, the VRA requires
jurisdictions to create districts where minority voters are numerous
enough to be able to elect their preferred candidates.17 These dis-
tricts tend to elect Democrats by large margins; minority voters lean
heavily Democratic, so it stands to reason that when many of them
are placed in certain districts, these districts tilt strongly in a Demo-
cratic direction. At the level of an entire plan, though, the construc-
tion of minority-opportunity districts may be expected to benefit
In an unpublished expert report, Simon Jackman also used a model with fixed effects for
states and years to analyze the impact of Democratic and Republican control on the efficiency
gap in congressional elections from 1972 to 2016. He found that Democratic control produced
a 3.4 percentage point swing in a Democratic direction, while Republican control produced a
5.5 percentage point swing in a Republican direction. See Simon Jackman, Assessing the
Current North Carolina Congressional Districting Plan 32-38 (Mar. 1, 2017) (unpublished
report) [hereinafter Jackman, North Carolina Report], http://roseinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/ 2016/05/Expert-Report-of-Simon-Jackman.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3P8-UAP5].
14. See Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legisla-
tive Elections 12 tbl.2 (Apr. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://citation.allacademic.
com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/6/9/5/p196951_index.html [https: //perma.cc/
7RUL-QKHN]; see also Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evalua-
tion of the Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 22-24, 22 fig.3 (2012)
(finding that California’s redistricting commission reduced its plans’ partisan biases from
about 5% to almost zero).
15. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 477,
496-98.
16. See id. at 498-501; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Conse-
quentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 710-11 (2013) (reporting similar results for the
1992-2012 period).
17. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-51 (1986) (setting forth the framework for
establishing racial vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); see also Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016).
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Republicans. If minority voters (and Democrats) are concentrated
in a small number of districts, then Republicans may be dispersed
more efficiently across a map’s remaining districts. These remaining
districts may be both whiter and more Republican than if the
minority-opportunity districts had not been drawn.18
However, greater minority representation may not necessarily
lead to a Republican edge. This is because it is possible to craft mi-
nority-opportunity districts that do not waste inordinate numbers
of Democratic votes. How? Simply by keeping these districts’ propor-
tions of minority voters (and Democrats) relatively low, and their
shares of Republicans relatively high. Then it is Republicans, not
Democrats, who waste more votes in the districts. Republican line-
drawers, of course, have no incentive to enhance Democratic per-
formance in this way; if they have to create minority-opportunity
districts, they would prefer to pack them with minority voters (and
Democrats). Democratic mapmakers, though, have every reason to
employ this strategy, which lets them comply with the VRA without
compromising their partisan objectives. Accordingly, we might
hypothesize that the relationship between minority representation
and Republican advantage is strongest under unified Republican
control of redistricting, weakest under unified Democratic control,
and intermediate under other institutions.19
Regrettably, the existing literature has not probed this link; not
a single study has considered how minority representation may
affect partisan bias, the efficiency gap, or any other measure of par-
tisan fairness. In the 1990s, however, scholars including David Can-
on, Kevin Hill, David Lublin, and Stephen Voss analyzed how the
sharp increase in Black representation in that decade influenced the
share of legislative seats held by Democrats.20 The conclusion of this
18. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323,
1384 (2016) (describing the potential trade-off between descriptive and substantive represen-
tation in more detail).
19. For similar hypotheses, see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial
and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 564-79 (2011); Stephanopoulos, supra
note 18, at 1384-85.
20. See, e.g., DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNIN-
TENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 74 (1999); DAVID LUBLIN, THE
PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN
CONGRESS 111 (1997); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Repub-
licans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J.
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work was that Democrats lost around ten congressional seats due
to the creation of additional minority-opportunity districts,21 as well
as two to sixteen state house seats in each of ten southern states.22
In an earlier article, I also used fixed effects models to assess how
minority representation and Democratic seat share were related in
state house elections from 1972 to 2014 under different configura-
tions of control over redistricting.23 I found that there was a trade off
between minority representation and Democratic seat share, and
that this trade off was exacerbated by unified Republican control
but alleviated by unified Democratic control.24
A final concept that is regularly tied to partisan fairness in both
academic and popular commentary is political geography.25 Political
geography can mean many things, but I use the term here to refer
to the spatial distribution of Democratic and Republican voters. If
one party’s supporters (say, Democrats in urban areas) are highly
concentrated while the other party’s backers (say, Republicans in
suburban, exurban, and rural regions) are more evenly allocated,
then it is possible that most district plans—even plans drawn
without any partisan intent—will favor the more efficiently dis-
persed Republicans. These plans may “naturally” pack Democrats
in a small number of urban districts where their preferred candi-
dates win by enormous margins. The plans may also “naturally”
crack Democrats among a large number of suburban, exurban, and
rural districts where their candidates of choice lose relatively
narrowly.
I place “naturally” in quotation marks in order to foreshadow
another hypothesis: that political geography may have only a small
and contingent relationship with partisan fairness. In any jurisdic-
tion with more than a handful of seats, there is a near-infinite
POLITICS 384, 398 (1995); David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, The Missing Middle: Why Median-
Voter Theory Can’t Save Democrats from Singing the Boll-Weevil Blues, 65 J. POLITICS 227,
231, 233 (2003).
21. See CANON, supra note 20, at 74, 257; LUBLIN, supra note 20, at 111-14.
22. See David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, Racial Redistricting and Realignment in South-
ern State Legislatures, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 792, 802 tbl.2 (2000).
23. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 18, at 1388-89.
24. See id. at 1389-93, 1392 fig.7(a), 1393 fig.7(b).
25. For academic commentary, see the discussion in the next paragraph. For popular
commentary, see BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009).
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number of ways in which the districts can be drawn. There is a
near-infinite number of ways, that is, in which voters can be spa-
tially aggregated. Many of these configurations may produce a bias
in favor of the more efficiently distributed party. But a substantial
number may not—for instance, if districts tend to combine a slightly
larger group of urban Democrats with a slightly smaller set of
suburban, exurban, or rural Republicans. And as with minority
representation, how political geography translates into partisan
fairness may depend on the institution responsible for redistricting.
Republicans may happily exploit spatial patterns by crafting many
wholly urban (and heavily Democratic) districts. In contrast,
Democrats may defy these patterns by designing more heteroge-
neous districts that merge urban and nonurban voters.26
Goedert is the only scholar who has included a measure of po-
litical geography—each state’s level of urbanization—in a model of
partisan fairness.27 Relying on a pair of cross-sectional analyses, he
found that more urbanized states had more pro-Republican
efficiency gaps at the congressional level in 2012, but that this link
disappeared in 2014.28 Also worth noting here are the redistricting
simulations carried out by Jowei Chen, David Cottrell, and Jona-
than Rodden.29 These authors used computer algorithms to generate
large numbers of state legislative and congressional plans (with
equal population, contiguity, and compactness as criteria), and then
compared the parties’ seat shares in the actual and simulated plans.
At the state legislative level and using 2000 data, most (but not all)
actual and simulated plans favored Republicans.30 At the congres-
sional level and using 2008 data, actual plans were about evenly
26. For good discussions of these line-drawing strategies, see Cox & Holden, supra note
19, at 575-78; and John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, Optimal Gerrymandering: Some-
times Pack, but Never Crack, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 113, 115 (2008).
27. See Goedert, Disappearing Bias, supra note 13, at 5 tbl.3; Goedert, Gerrymandering
or Geography?, supra note 13, at 6 tbl.2.
28. See Goedert, Disappearing Bias, supra note 13, at 5; Goedert, Gerrymandering or
Geography?, supra note 13, at 5-6. Again, Goedert used a metric similar but not identical to
the efficiency gap in his analysis.
29. Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerry-
mandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S.
House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329 (2016); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional
Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239
(2013).
30. See Chen & Rodden, supra note 29, at 263 fig.8.
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divided between those that benefited Democrats and those that
benefited Republicans relative to the simulated plans.31
Shifting gears from the causes to the consequences of partisan
gerrymandering, a simple logical chain connects it to distorted
representation—that is, representation out of kilter with the views
of the electorate. Take a state whose voters are closely divided in
both partisan and ideological terms. Next assume that a severe pro-
Democratic (pro-Republican) gerrymander is in place, resulting in
the election of significantly more Democrats (Republicans) than
would have won office under a neutral plan. Posit further that
Democratic and Republican legislators differ in their voting records
and ideologies, with Democrats being more liberal and Republicans
being more conservative.32 The necessary conclusion is that under
the pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) gerrymander, the state legis-
lature or congressional delegation is more liberal (conservative)
than it would have been under a neutral map. Likewise, the legis-
lature or delegation is more liberal (conservative) than the state’s
closely divided electorate.
In a recent article, Devin Caughey, Chris Tausanovitch, and
Christopher Warshaw assessed exactly this claim at the state house
level. Using a fixed effects model for elections from 1995 to 2012,
they found that a one standard deviation pro-Democratic (pro-
Republican) shift in the efficiency gap led to about a 0.4 standard
deviation pro-liberal (pro-conservative) shift in the ideology of the
median state house member.33 Intriguingly, Caughey, Tausanovitch,
and Warshaw extended this analysis from representation to actual
policy outcomes. They showed that a one standard deviation pro-
Democratic (pro-Republican) shift in the efficiency gap also pushed
a state’s overall set of policies by 2.4 percentage points in a liberal
31. See Chen & Cottrell, supra note 29, at 335 fig.3, 337 fig.4.
32. This assumption has become increasingly accurate over the last few decades. See Boris
Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 530, 546 (2011) (same for state legislatures); VOTEVIEW.ORG, supra note 6 (showing the
rising polarization of members of Congress).
33. See Devin Caughey et al., Partisan Gerrymandering and the Political Process: Effects
on Roll-Call Voting and State Policies, 16 ELECTION L.J. 453, 457-58 (2017).
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(conservative) direction.34 By comparison, this is about twice the
impact of switching the governor from one party to the other.35
To recap, redistricting theory and available scholarship support
four hypotheses about the explanations and implications of district
plans’ partisan fairness. First, unified control of the line-drawing
process predictably benefits the party in charge, while other insti-
tutions have small and erratic partisan effects. Second, greater
minority representation leads to a Republican advantage, except
perhaps when Democrats are responsible for redistricting. Third,
greater urbanization also favors Republicans, also except maybe
when Democrats draw the lines. And fourth, maps’ partisan tilt is
a significant driver of their representational skew. In the balance of
the Article, I test these hypotheses using nearly fifty years of data
at both the state house and congressional levels.
II. DATA AND METHODS
The principal datasets on which I rely are of the efficiency gap by
state and year in state house and congressional elections.36 At the
state house level, there are 786 observations from 206 district plans
and 41 states, spanning elections from 1972 to 2014.37 At the con-
gressional level, there are 512 observations from 136 plans and 25
states (all with at least 7 seats), spanning elections from 1972 to
2016.38 These scores are computed using actual election results
whenever districts were contested by both major parties, and using
imputations whenever races did not feature two major-party candi-
dates.39 Negative values indicate a Republican advantage (that is,
more Democratic than Republican wasted votes); positive values
denote a Democratic edge. As noted earlier, at both the state house
and congressional levels, the historical distribution of the efficiency
34. See id. at 463-64.
35. See id. at 464.
36. These scores were calculated by Simon Jackman. See Jackman, North Carolina Re-
port, supra note 13, at 19-20; Simon Jackman, Assessing the Current Wisconsin State Legis-
lative Districting Plan 19-20 (July 7, 2015) (unpublished report) [hereinafter Jackman,
Wisconsin Report], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559c1a7be4b0a2650c6c39b3/t/559d
3df7e4b041328d05ee45/1436368375316/Exhibit+3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHN9-RNB9].
37. See Jackman, Wisconsin Report, supra note 36, at 6.
38. See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 10, 19-20.
39. See id. at 21-27; Jackman, Wisconsin Report, supra note 36, at 24-31.
2018] CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GERRYMANDERING 2129
gap is normal and centered very close to zero.40 At both levels, the
efficiency gap has also trended in a Republican direction over the
last three redistricting cycles.41
With respect to the potential causes of district plans’ partisan
skews, I compiled data on most of them in previous work. The insti-
tution responsible for redistricting is coded by plan using five
dummy variables: unified Democratic control, unified Republican
control, court, commission, or divided government.42 Minority repre-
sentation is coded using the shares of state house or congressional
seats held by African American or Latino legislators.43 And consis-
tent with Goedert’s analysis, I rely on each state’s level of urbaniza-
tion as a proxy for political geography.44 Urbanization does not
directly capture the spatial distribution of Democratic or Republican
voters, but unfortunately, there is no currently available and time-
variant measure that does.
With respect to the representational consequences of district
plans’ partisan tilts, I code House members’ ideologies using the
DW-Nominate scores developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosen-
thal.45 These scores are derived from House members’ roll call voting
records, and capture on a single left-right axis the members’ “ideal
points”—that is, the “unique set[s] of policies that they ‘prefer’ to all
others.”46 The scores range from roughly -1 (very liberal) to +1 (very
conservative); as a point of calibration, the House median in the
most recent session for which data is available (2013-2014) was
40. See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 28 fig.6; Jackman, Wisconsin
Report, supra note 36, at 7 fig.1.
41. See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 30 fig.7; Jackman, Wisconsin
Report, supra note 36, at 45 fig.20.
42. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 15, at 497; Stephanopoulos, supra note 18, at 1388-89.
43. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 18, at 1367. I note that these seat shares are not
identical to the proportions of minority-opportunity districts. The two measures are very
highly correlated, though. See id. at 1362.
44. See Goedert, Disappearing Bias, supra note 13, at 5 tbl.3; Goedert, Gerrymandering
or Geography?, supra note 13, at 6 tbl.2; see also 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification
and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/
urban-rural-2010.html [https://perma.cc/2Z4M-3CT5].
45. See Royce Carroll et al., DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors,
VOTEVIEW.ORG, http://www.voteview.org/dwnomin.htm [https://perma.cc/ EA23-W3XP].
46. Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Prefer-
ences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POLITICS 330, 331 (2013).
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about 0.5.47 (I do not examine state legislators’ ideologies because
Caughey, Tausanovitch, and Warshaw have already done so quite
thoroughly.)48
In the main analysis, I regress the efficiency gap on the five dum-
my variables for the institution responsible for redistricting,49 Black
and Latino seat share, and urbanization. I also include controls for
the Democratic share of the statewide vote (to take into account the
overall electoral environment) and the number of seats in the plan
(due to the efficiency gap’s greater “lumpiness” as the number of
seats declines). I further include fixed effects for states and years,
and cluster standard errors by plan.50 The state-year fixed effects
represent a rigorous methodological choice for panel data. They
control for any time trends as well as for any fixed differences
among states due to politics, economics, demography, culture, or
other factors.51
In a series of robustness checks, I replace state fixed effects with
state random effects; add a control for the lagged efficiency gap (that
is, the efficiency gap in the previous election); and change the de-
pendent variable to partisan bias.52 To further probe the impact of
control of the redistricting process, I also use a technique known as
nearest-neighbor matching.53 This method identifies observations
that are as similar as possible in terms of a series of covariates
(Democratic share of the statewide vote, Black seat share, and
urbanization)—but that differ in the institution responsible for
47. See Carroll et al., supra note 45. I note that I use only the first-dimension DW-Nomin-
ate scores in this analysis.
48. See generally Caughey et al., supra note 33.
49. Divided government is the omitted variable.
50. For a similar efficiency gap analysis also including state-year fixed effects and clus-
tering standard errors by plan, see Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 34.
51. For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see Eric McGhee et
al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 337, 343 (2014).
52. For similar robustness checks, see Caughey et al., supra note 33, at 457-61. Because
partisan bias becomes less reliable in less competitive electoral settings, Stephanopoulos,
supra note 18, at 1360, 1376, 1391; see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 855-62,
when I use it as the dependent variable I consider only cases where the statewide vote was
closer than 55% to 45%.
53. For a useful discussion, see Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, Bias-Corrected
Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 1, 3 (2011). Per
Abadie and Imbens’s recommendation, I use the bias-adjustment estimator when conducting
the nearest-neighbor matching.
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redistricting.54 The method yields a “treatment effect” that corre-
sponds to the change in the efficiency gap that occurs when ob-
servations are “treated” with a particular redistricting institution.
Additionally, to determine whether the influence of Black seat share
or urbanization varies by party, I run two more models with in-
teractions between these variables, respectively, and unified Demo-
cratic and Republican control of redistricting.55
The final model I specify addresses the representational implica-
tions of district plans’ partisan skews. The dependent variable is the
median DW-Nominate score of the members of each House delega-
tion. The independent variables are the efficiency gap and the
Democratic share of the statewide vote. I again include fixed effects
for states and years, and cluster standard errors by state. And to
establish robustness, I add a control for the lagged median DW-
Nominate score; replace the median with the average DW-Nominate
score; and replace the efficiency gap with partisan bias.
III. RESULTS
A. Main Analysis
Beginning with the main analysis, Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix
display the results of the state house and congressional models,
respectively.56 In both models, unified Democratic control of re-
districting is statistically significant and associated with a pro-
Democratic shift in the efficiency gap of 3 to 3.5 percentage points.
Unified Republican control is also statistically significant, but inter-
estingly, its impact is about twice as large at the congressional level
(about -4.5 percentage points) as at the state house level (roughly -2
54. I define the “control” group for each “treatment” as follows: for unified Democratic con-
trol, all plans except those under unified Republican control; for unified Republican control,
all plans except those under unified Democratic control; and for court usage, commission
usage, and divided government, all plans except those under unified Democratic or Republican
control. In other words, the control group never includes plans enacted under single-party
rule. I also do not include Latino seat share as a covariate due to insufficient variation and
to reduce the number of factors that must be matched.
55. For a similar analysis, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 18, at 1388-89.
56. See infra Appendix, Tables 1-2. Again, divided government is the omitted variable.
The coefficients therefore represent the impact of adopting a particular redistricting insti-
tution relative to the benchmark of divided government.
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percentage points). Neither commission usage nor court usage rises
to statistical significance in the state house model; in the congressio-
nal model, commission usage again fails to do so, but court usage
results in a pro-Democratic shift in the efficiency gap of about 3
percentage points.
Turning to minority representation, there is a negative and sta-
tistically significant relationship between Black seat share and the
efficiency gap at both the state house and congressional levels. That
is, as Black legislators win more seats, the efficiency gap moves in
a Republican direction. There is no such relationship, however,
between Latino seat share and the efficiency gap in either state
house or congressional elections. Lastly, urbanization is negatively
and significantly linked to the efficiency gap at the state house level
but not at the congressional level. It is thus only at the former level
that Republicans perform better in more urbanized states (and
Democrats enjoy an edge in more rural ones).
To make these results more concrete, Figure 1 shows the impact
on the efficiency gap of adopting a particular redistricting institu-
tion and of increasing each of the continuous variables (Black seat
share, Latino seat share, and urbanization) by one standard
deviation.57 (The left panel is for state houses; the right panel is for
congressional delegations.) A few points stand out from the charts.
First, the efficiency gap effects are generally larger at the congres-
sional level than at the state house level. This is likely because
congressional delegations typically have fewer seats than state
houses, meaning that each congressional seat that changes hands
represents a more sizable gain or loss in percentage point terms.
Second, the confidence interval for commission usage at the con-
gressional level is larger than for any other redistricting institution.
The probable explanation is that not many observations involve
congressional plans designed by commissions (only 37 out of 512),
and a few of these plans exhibited highly variable efficiency gaps.58
Third, the substantive impact of increasing Black seat share by
one standard deviation is quite small: only about a 1 percentage
point shift in the efficiency gap in a Republican direction. Thus even
57. For the sake of simplicity, I omit the control variables (the Democratic share of the
statewide vote and the number of seats in each plan) from the figure.
58. See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 35 fig.10.
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though the negative relationship between Black seat share and the
efficiency gap is statistically significant, it is not particularly
meaningful in practical terms. And fourth, in contrast, the substan-
tive impact of increasing urbanization by one standard deviation is
considerable—roughly equivalent to switching from divided govern-
ment to unified Republican control of redistricting. However, the
confidence interval for urbanization is also large, especially at the
congressional level, and explains why the variable fails to attain
statistical significance in that model despite its seemingly sizable
effect. 
These results are mostly confirmed by the robustness checks.59
Unified Democratic control remains statistically significant in all of
the alternative state house models and in all but one of the alterna-
tive congressional models. Unified Republican control stays statis-
tically significant in every other model permutation. Commission
usage fails to attain significance in every state house model and in
all but one congressional model. Court usage remains statistically
insignificant in every state house model, and significant in one
additional congressional model. Black seat share continues to have
a negative and statistically significant relationship with the
efficiency gap in four of the six alternative models. Latino seat share
never exhibits a significant relationship. And urbanization remains
a statistically significant driver of the efficiency gap in two of the
other three state house models, while it remains insignificant in all
of the other congressional models. We can conclude, then, that the
outcomes of the main analysis are strongly corroborated by the
additional testing.
59. These checks are also displayed in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. See infra Appendix,
Tables 1-2.
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Figure 1. Efficiency Gap Impacts from Regression Analysis
The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for
congressional elections. The point estimates represent the impact on
the efficiency gap of adopting a particular redistricting institution
or increasing a continuous variable by one standard deviation. The
bars to the left and right of the point estimates denote 95% confi-
dence intervals.
B. Nearest-Neighbor Matching
I turn next to the nearest-neighbor matching, which further il-
luminates how different redistricting institutions affect the efficien-
cy gap. (The technique can be used only for categorical variables,
and so is inapplicable to the continuous variables in the preceding
analysis.) Figure 2 depicts the efficiency gap impact of “treating” an
observation with a particular institution—that is, comparing that
observation to another entry that is as similar as possible in terms
of several covariates, but that differs in the author of its district
plan.60 Again, the left panel is for state houses, while the right panel
is for congressional delegations. Because there is some evidence that
60. The makeup of the “control” group for each redistricting institution is described above.
See supra note 54. However, the results are not appreciably different if all other observations
are used as the control group. Nor do the results vary materially if the covariates are
amended to include Latino seat share, Black population share, Latino population share, the
number of seats in a plan, and/or the election year. And no treatment effect is shown for
commissions at the congressional level between 1972 and 1990 because none were used in this
period (for cases in my database).
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unified control of redistricting has become more potent in recent
years,61 the charts include separate estimates for the entire modern
period, the 1970s and 1980s cycles, and the cycles from the 1990s to
the present.
Starting with unified Democratic control, its treatment effect has
been fairly constant at the state house level, varying only modestly
between the 1972-1990 period (6.0%) and the 1992-2014 period
(4.3%). At the congressional level, in contrast, the impact of unified
Democratic control on the efficiency gap rose dramatically between
the 1970s and 1980s (1.6%) and the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s (7.9%).
Next, the treatment effect of unified Republican control nearly
doubled at the state house level from the earlier period (-3.3%) to
the later one (-5.4%). And its impact more than doubled at the
congressional level (-3.8% to -10.5%).
 With respect to redistricting commissions, their treatment effect
was substantively small and statistically indistinguishable from
zero at all times in state house elections. In congressional elections,
their impact was larger but still statistically insignificant. Courts
present a more mixed picture. For the entire modern period, the
efficiency gap impact of a court-drawn plan was close to zero at the
state house level but reasonably pro-Democratic at the congressio-
nal level (3.2%). At both levels, the impact of a court-drawn plan
became somewhat more pro-Republican over time. Lastly, the
treatment effect of divided government was consistently near zero
and statistically insignificant in state house elections. But in con-
gressional elections, its impact was quite pro-Republican (-5.3%),
albeit less so over the last three cycles (-2.5%).
It is important to note that these results cannot be compared
directly to the outputs of the earlier regression analysis. The
benchmarks for comparison are different: divided government in the
regression analysis,62 as opposed to a control group of all other
observations not under single-party rule here.63 The regression
analysis also includes several controls absent here: Latino seat
61. See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 13, at 34 tbl.1 (finding that unified
Democratic control has its largest impact on the efficiency gap from 2002 to 2016, and that
unified Republican control has its largest impact from 1992 to 2016).
62. See supra note 49.
63. See supra note 54.
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share, the number of seats in each plan, as well as the state and
year fixed effects. Nevertheless, the consistency of the two tech-
niques’ outcomes is striking. In both cases, unified control of the
state government consistently and sizably benefits the party in
charge. In both cases, other redistricting institutions also tend to
have small and uneven effects on the efficiency gap. The nearest-
neighbor matching therefore adds detail to the portrait already
painted—in particular, by showing how the impact of unified control
has grown in recent years. But it does not unsettle any of the prior
conclusions.
Figure 2. Efficiency Gap Impacts from Nearest-Neighbor
Matching
The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for
congressional elections. The point estimates represent the “treat-
ment effect” of adopting a particular redistricting institution, rela-
tive to a control group of other observations not under single-party
rule. The bars to the left and right of the point estimates denote 95%
confidence intervals.
C. Interactive Analysis
The next analysis investigates whether the influence of Black
seat share and urbanization on the efficiency gap varies based on
the party responsible for redistricting. Table 3 in the Appendix dis-
plays the results of state house and congressional models identical
to those presented earlier—except that they now include interac-
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tions between unified Democratic control and Black seat share and
between unified Republican control and Black seat share.64 Using
these models, Figure 3 shows predicted efficiency gap values for
different Black seat shares in state houses and congressional dele-
gations, under conditions of unified Democratic control, unified Re-
publican control, and non-unified control.65 All other variables are
held constant at their means. As before, the left panel is for state
houses, while the right panel is for congressional delegations.
When neither party is solely responsible for redistricting, there
is a negative relationship (statistically significant only in the con-
gressional model) between Black seat share and the efficiency gap.
As Black seat share increases from 0% to 15% (about a standard
deviation above its mean), the efficiency gap declines from roughly
0% to -2% in the state house model, and from roughly 3% to -2% in
the congressional model. Unified Republican control amplifies this
negative relationship. Under this configuration, as Black seat share
rises from 0% to 15%, the efficiency gap falls from about -1% to -6%
in the state house model, and from about 0% to -7% in the congres-
sional model. Unified Democratic control, on the other hand,
transforms the relationship. At the state house level, it raises the
efficiency gap at all levels of Black seat share, so that as Black seat
share grows from 0% to 15%, the efficiency gap only drops from
roughly 3% to 0%. And at the congressional level, unified Demo-
cratic control reverses the link, so that the efficiency gap rises from
3% to 4% as Black seat share goes from 0% to 15%.
64. See infra Appendix, Table 3. I do not carry out this analysis for Latino seat share
because there is no indication that it significantly affects the efficiency gap.
65. I show Black seat share up to approximately its 95th percentile, or 25%.
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Figure 3. Predicted Efficiency Gaps for Different Black Seat
Shares
The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for
congressional elections. Predicted efficiency gaps are shown sep-
arately for the scenarios of unified Democratic control, unified
Republican control, and non-unified control. Black seat share varies
from 0% to 25%; all other variables are held constant at their
means.
Table 4 in the Appendix repeats this analysis, only this time with
urbanization interacted with unified Democratic control and uni-
fied Republican control.66 Figure 4 depicts predicted efficiency gap
values for different levels of urbanization in state houses and
congressional delegations, under conditions of unified Democratic
control, unified Republican control, and non-unified control.67 Again,
all other variables are held constant at their means, the left panel
is for state houses and the right panel is for congressional delega-
tions.
When neither party has full line-drawing authority, there is a
negative and statistically significant relationship between urban-
ization and the efficiency gap. As urbanization increases from 60%
to 80% (or about a standard deviation below to a standard deviation
above its mean), the efficiency gap declines from roughly 2% to -3%
in the state house model, and from roughly 10% to -2% in the con-
gressional model. This negative relationship becomes somewhat
(though not statistically significantly) stronger under unified
66. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
67. I show urbanization from roughly its 10th percentile (50%) to its 90th percentile (90%).
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Republican control. Under this configuration, as urbanization rises
from 60% to 80%, the efficiency gap falls from about -1% to -5% in
the state house model, and from about 6% to -6% in the congres-
sional model. Unified Democratic control also alleviates the rela-
tionship only modestly (and not statistically significantly). With
Democrats in charge of redistricting, as urbanization grows from
60% to 80%, the efficiency gap drops from roughly 4% to 1% in the
state house model, and from roughly 10% to 2% in the congressional
model.
There is an interesting difference, then, in how Black seat share
and urbanization interact with party control. Both parties are able
to manipulate the link between Black seat share and the efficiency
gap—Republicans by tilting plans further in their favor as Black
representation increases, Democrats by negating the connection
between Black representation and partisan fairness altogether. In
contrast, neither party has the capacity to sway substantially the
relationship between urbanization and the efficiency gap. This rela-
tionship does shift in each party’s direction when it is solely respon-
sible for redistricting, but not to the point of statistical significance.
What accounts for this contrast? A likely explanation is that
Black seat share is a more malleable variable than urbanization. In
other words, it is easier for each party to achieve a certain level of
Black representation and an efficiency gap that benefits it. Demo-
crats simply create Black-opportunity districts that elect Black-
preferred candidates by relatively slim margins; Republicans simply
craft such districts that propel such candidates to overwhelming
victories. Urbanization, on the other hand, may be harder for the
parties to finesse. In a highly urbanized state, for example, Demo-
crats may have little choice but to design numerous heavily Demo-
cratic districts in the urban core. In a more rural state, similarly,
Republicans may be constrained in cracking or packing Democratic
voters who are dispersed relatively evenly. This is not to say, of
course, that urbanization is destiny for purposes of partisan
fairness. The point is only that the natural pull of urbanization may
be more difficult for the parties to resist than that of Black repre-
sentation.
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Figure 4. Predicted Efficiency Gaps for Different Levels of
Urbanization
The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for con-
gressional elections. Predicted efficiency gaps are shown separately
for the scenarios of unified Democratic control, unified Republican
control, and non-unified control. Urbanization varies from 50% to
90%; all other variables are held constant at their means.
D. Representational Analysis
The final analysis considers the representational implications—
not the causes—of district plans’ partisan tilts. Before getting to the
regression results, Figure 5 plots the median DW-Nominate score
of each congressional delegation versus the Democratic share of the
statewide vote.68 Separate lowess curves are included for plans with
large Democratic efficiency gaps (greater than 10%), large Republi-
can efficiency gaps (less than -10%), and intermediate efficiency
gaps (between -10% and 10%). About one-tenth of plans have ef-
ficiency gaps greater than 10%, and roughly another one-tenth have
efficiency gaps less than -10%, rendering this a logical cutoff.69
Figure 5 is notable in at least two respects. First, and most impor-
tantly, for values of the Democratic share of the statewide vote near
50%, there are dramatic differences in the median DW-Nominate
68. For the sake of symmetry, I truncate the Democratic share of the statewide vote at
40% and 60%. This captures about 90% of observations.
69. Cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) (declaring that “‘under 10%’ [population]
deviations ... [are] of prima facie constitutional validity”).
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score among plans with pro-Democratic, pro-Republican, and inter-
mediate efficiency gaps. At the 50% point, for instance, a plan with
a pro-Democratic efficiency gap typically has a median DW-Nomin-
ate score around -0.2, a plan with an intermediate efficiency gap
typically has a DW-Nominate median around 0, and a plan with a
pro-Republican efficiency gap typically has a DW-Nominate median
around 0.4. This means that switching from a pro-Democratic to a
pro-Republican plan—while keeping constant the partisan prefer-
ences of the electorate—shifts the DW-Nominate median by about
0.6, or roughly 2 standard deviations, in a conservative direction.
This is plainly a very large effect.
Second, this effect stays similarly large for Democratic vote
shares well below 50%, but it mostly evaporates for Democratic vote
shares well above 50%. In fact, as the Democratic vote share
approaches 60%, the median DW-Nominate score is almost the same
whether a plan has a pro-Democratic, a pro-Republican, or an inter-
mediate efficiency gap. This indicates that when either party has
the advantage in a heavily Democratic state, the additional mem-
bers it elects are not ideologically extreme. Conversely, in a heavily
Republican state, extra Democrats (elected under a pro-Democratic
plan) are quite liberal, while extra Republicans (elected under a pro-
Republican plan) are very conservative.
Figure 5 suggests that pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) efficiency
gaps are associated with more liberal (more conservative) congres-
sional delegations, even holding constant states’ electoral environ-
ments. The model reported in Table 5 in the Appendix confirms this
expectation.70 The coefficient for the efficiency gap is statistically
significant and substantively large, controlling for the Democratic
share of the statewide vote and including state and year fixed ef-
fects. In fact, a shift in the efficiency gap from 10% to -10% yields a
shift in the median DW-Nominate score of about 0.3, or roughly 0.8
standard deviations, in a conservative direction. Thus even when a
host of additional variables are considered, the impact of the ef-
ficiency gap on congressional representation remains almost as
impressive as in the initial correlational analysis.
70. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
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This conclusion is bolstered by the robustness checks also re-
ported in Table 5.71 The coefficient for the efficiency gap stays statis-
tically significant—and substantively large—when a control is
added for the lagged DW-Nominate median and when the depend-
ent variable is switched from the median to the average DW-
Nominate score of each congressional delegation.72 Even when the
efficiency gap is replaced as an independent variable by partisan
bias, the coefficient for the latter is statistically significant and
substantively large as well. We can therefore be highly confident
that district plans’ partisan skews indeed have representational
consequences. Pro-Democratic plans make House delegations mar-
kedly more liberal; pro-Republican plans do the same but in the
opposite direction.
71. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
72. Specifically, a shift in the efficiency gap from 10% to -10% yields a shift in the average
DW-Nominate score of about 0.13, or roughly 0.0037 standard deviations, in a conservative
direction. The DW-Nominate average has a smaller standard deviation than the DW-
Nominate median (0.2 versus 0.3), likely because in a polarized Congress, flipped seats can
sometimes drastically change the delegation median while only somewhat shifting its mean.
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Figure 5. Median DW-Nominate Score Versus Statewide
Democratic Vote Share
Scatter plot of congressional delegations’ median DW-Nominate
scores versus states’ Democratic vote shares in the preceding con-
gressional election. Separate lowess curves are plotted for plans
with large Democratic efficiency gaps (greater than 10%), large
Republican efficiency gaps (less than -10%), and intermediate effi-
ciency gaps (between -10% and 10%).
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The above findings can be distilled into a series of stylized facts
about the causes and consequences of gerrymandering. First, unified
control of the redistricting process significantly benefits the party
in charge—indeed, to a greater extent than any other variable.
Second, other redistricting institutions do not sizably or consistently
advantage either party. Third, greater Black representation (but
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not greater Latino representation) leads to slightly larger pro-
Republican skews (but not when Democrats are responsible for
redistricting). Fourth, greater urbanization yields modestly larger
pro-Republican tilts, and this effect is mostly unmediated by parti-
san control. And fifth, the partisan fairness of congressional plans
dramatically influences the representational distortion of House
delegations.
What do these facts mean for scholars, courts, and reformers?
Starting with scholars, the results confirm the conclusions of two
bodies of existing work. One of these bodies has found, using simple
comparisons and cross-sectional analyses, that unified control of the
redistricting process considerably benefits the party in charge.73
This finding turns out to hold even when far more data—and far
more rigorous techniques—are employed in the analysis.74 The other
strand in the literature is Caughey, Tausanovitch, and Warshaw’s
study showing that large efficiency gaps substantially shift state
houses’ ideological midpoints as well as states’ enacted policies.75 At
least with respect to representation, the same is true at the congres-
sional level: pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) efficiency gaps strong-
ly push House delegations’ median ideal points to the left (right).76
On the other hand, the results tend to undercut earlier work that
has stressed the pro-Republican implications of minority represen-
tation77 and political geography.78 As to minority representation, the
shares of state house and congressional seats held by America’s
largest minority group, Latinos, have no effect at all on the effi-
ciency gap. Greater Black representation does shift the efficiency
gap in a Republican direction—but only marginally, by about 1 per-
centage point when Black seat share increases by a full standard
deviation. And even this small swing disappears when Democrats
are responsible for redistricting.79 Likewise, as to political geogra-
73. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Note also that Gelman and King used
a multiyear model with state fixed effects in their analysis. See Gelman & King, supra note
2, at 550.
74. See supra Parts III.A-B.
75. See Caughey et al., supra note 33, at 457-61.
76. See supra Part III.D.
77. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
79. See supra Parts III.A, III.C.
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phy, urbanization has a statistically significant and pro-Republican
impact at the state house level but not at the congressional level.
Even at the state house level, a rise in urbanization of 1 standard
deviation pushes the efficiency gap by only about 3 percentage
points in a Republican direction. And such a rise, of course, is highly
unrealistic in any reasonable timeframe; the average state’s level of
urbanization changes by only about 2 percentage points (or one-
seventh of a standard deviation) per decade.80
Beyond challenging the conventional wisdom in certain respects,
and validating it in others, the results suggest several promising
avenues for future research. First, it would be worthwhile to find
out if the same conclusions hold for other measures of partisan
fairness.81 I substituted partisan bias for the efficiency gap as a
robustness check in each set of models, and determined that this
substitution made little substantive difference. But I did not subject
partisan bias to the same array of tests as the efficiency gap, and I
did not analyze other partisan fairness metrics at all.
Second, it would be advisable to incorporate states’ redistricting
criteria—compactness, respect for political subdivisions, respect for
communities of interest, and so on—into the models, as well as data
on how closely these criteria are actually heeded. Most states must
abide by at least some line-drawing requirements, and both the
existence and the extent of compliance with these rules may affect
plans’ partisan fairness.82 And third, as I mentioned earlier, urban-
ization is a suboptimal proxy for political geography because it does
not directly capture the spatial distribution of Democratic or
Republican voters.83 Better metrics do exist, like the isolation index
(for the average party member living in a given geographic unit,
what share of her neighbors in the unit belong to the same party)
and Global Moran’s I (a measure of spatial autocorrelation indicat-
80. See supra Parts III.A, III.C; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 44.
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. For a first pass at this sort of analysis, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 710 tbl.2,
711 tbl.3 (including several redistricting criteria in partisan fairness models covering only the
1992-2012 period and lacking fixed effects). See generally JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES
OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLA-
TIVE REDISTRICTING 7 (2008) (arguing that state requirements that political subdivisions be
respected reduced gerrymandering in the 2000 cycle).
83. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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ing the degree to which Democrats or Republicans are geographi-
cally clustered).84 However, these metrics have not yet been comput-
ed for many states over many years because the necessary geocoded,
precinct-level election results have not been available. If and when
this data does become accessible, it may shed more light on how
political geography and partisan fairness are intertwined.
Turning from scholars to courts, one of the main arguments
advanced by states sued for partisan gerrymandering is that their
plans’ partisan skews are the product of political geography and
compliance with the VRA—not partisan intent. In Whitford v. Gill,
for example, Wisconsin claimed (and a dissenting judge agreed) that
“urban, more Democratic, voters are more closely packed together
than suburbanites and farmsteaders, who lean more Republican but
who are interspersed with lots of Democrats nonetheless.”85 “Wiscon-
sin’s political geography” therefore allegedly “result[ed] in hundreds
of thousands of ‘wasted’ votes in inevitable landslide Democratic
victories.”86 Similarly, Wisconsin (and the dissenting judge) stressed
that many “heavily Democratic inner-city wards in Milwaukee” that
were “between 93% and 95% Black” were placed in districts that
were drawn “with an eye to Voting Rights Act concerns.”87 The VRA
thus “naturally packed Democratic voters in Milwaukee.”88
 This Article’s findings help to rebut such assertions. As to po-
litical geography, not only is the impact of urbanization on the
efficiency gap comparatively modest, but Wisconsin is not even an
especially urbanized state. In fact, it is somewhat less urbanized
than the average state, meaning that its political geography mildly
favors Democrats relative to the national mean.89 As to VRA compli-
ance, analogously, if greater Black representation slightly benefits
Republicans in Wisconsin, it does so only because Republicans drew
84. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Rebuttal Report: Response to Expert Reports of Sean Trende
and Nicholas Goedert 16-18 (Mar. 31, 2016) (unpublished report), http://www.campaignlegal
center.org/sites/default/files/Mayer-WHITFORD%20V.%20NICHOL-Report-Rebuttal%20%
28revised%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF5W-X8RU].
85. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court) (Griesbach, J., dissent-
ing), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
86. Id. at 934.
87. Id. at 959 n.16, 961 & n.18.
88. Id. at 958.
89. According to the 2010 Census, Wisconsin was 70.2% urbanized, compared to a national
average of 73.6%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 44.
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the district lines. There would likely be no connection between Black
seat share and partisan fairness if Democrats had been responsible
for redistricting. Moreover, only 3% of Wisconsin’s state house seats
are represented by African Americans.90 At this low level of Black
representation (relative to the country as a whole), the variable ac-
tually advantages Democrats regardless of the redistricting insti-
tution. 
The Article’s relevance to courts, though, may ultimately stem
less from these sorts of empirical details, and more from the link it
establishes between partisan unfairness and representational dis-
tortion. The only reason for courts to try to police partisan gerry-
mandering is their belief that the practice subverts democratic
values and will not cease in the absence of judicial intervention.91
Whether the practice subverts democratic values, however, has been
an open question until now.92 It obviously produces discrepancies
between parties’ seat and vote shares, but these gaps are not neces-
sarily tantamount to a democratic malfunction. What is undeniably
a democratic malfunction, though, is representation that does not
reflect the ideological preferences of the electorate—representation
that is much more liberal or much more conservative than voters
actually want.93 And this is exactly the consequence of gerrymander-
ing that the Article documents: at least at the congressional level,
large efficiency gaps produce large shifts in the ideology of a House
delegation’s median member. Courts may therefore rest assured
that their entry into this political thicket is theoretically justified.
Gerrymandering imperils representation itself, not just the
alignment of parties’ seat and vote shares.
This threat is also highly pertinent to reformers. There are many
practices that trouble good-government advocates: voting restric-
90. As I noted earlier, I coded states’ levels of Black and Latino representation in a previ-
ous project. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
91. The canonical work making this argument is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
92. More precisely, it has been an open question at the congressional level. At the state
house level, Caughey, Tausanovitch, and Warshaw have already shown that large efficiency
gaps influence both the ideal point of the median legislator and enacted policy. See Caughey
et al., supra note 33, at 457-61.
93. At least, this is a malfunction under any democratic theory that values congruence
between voters and their elected representatives. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014).
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tions, unrestricted campaign expenditures, closed primaries, and so
on. But few, if any, of these policies have the same confirmed con-
nection with distorted representation as partisan gerrymandering.
A strong case can be made, then, that reformers should prioritize
gerrymandering above other ills that they seek to remedy. Most of
these other ills do not drive a comparable wedge between voters and
their representatives. (Or if they do, this effect has yet to be empir-
ically demonstrated.)94
Equally significantly for reformers, this Article’s findings reveal
that redistricting commissions do not generally benefit either party
when they enact plans. Commissions, of course, are good-govern-
ment advocates’ preferred solution to partisan gerrymandering—an
institutional response that removes the power to draw district lines
entirely from the hands of self-interested legislators.95 Commissions,
it also turns out, are not a statistically significant driver of the ef-
ficiency gap at either the state house or the congressional level.96
Nor, according to the nearest-neighbor matching, does “treating” an
observation by switching from some other institution to commission
control push the efficiency gap in either party’s direction—not in
earlier redistricting cycles and not in more recent decades either.97
Reformers, then, should be heartened by this information as they
lobby for commissions to be adopted in states across the country.
Based on the historical record, there is little risk that these bodies
will inadvertently assist either party.98
CONCLUSION
Recent advances in measuring partisan gerrymandering have not
been matched by similar progress in understanding the practice’s
94. For an effort to measure the representational consequences of a host of electoral
policies, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 761, 783-824 (2015).
95. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 15, at 487-91 (presenting the theoretical case for
redistricting commissions).
96. See supra Part III.A.
97. See supra Part III.B.
98. On the positive side of the ledger, there is also evidence that commissions reduce the
size of the efficiency gap, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 15, at 496-501, and improve the
ideological alignment between the median voter and the median state house member, see
Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 94, at 813-15.
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causes and consequences. Accordingly, this Article carries out the
most rigorous examination to date of the factors that drive district
plans’ partisan skews and of these skews’ representational implica-
tions. In a nutshell, the Article’s conclusions are that single-party
control of redistricting fosters partisan unfairness more than any
other variable, and that such unfairness translates directly into ide-
ologically distorted representation. These results are not necessarily
surprising, but they establish that, at its core, gerrymandering is
both a deliberate and a democratically debilitating phenomenon.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. State House Analysis
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Main
Random Ef-
fects
Lagged EG
Partisan
Bias
     
Unified Democratic 0.0345*** 0.0372*** 0.0222*** 0.0564***
(0.00839) (0.00937) (0.00614) (0.00946)
Unified Republican -0.0211** -0.0210** -0.0128** -0.0350***
(0.00929) (0.0102) (0.00630) (0.00944)
Commission 0.0194 0.0151 0.0154 0.0104
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.00962) (0.0133)
Court 0.00342 0.00120 0.00160 0.00573
(0.00855) (0.00791) (0.00622) (0.00935)
Black Seat Share -0.211* -0.188** -0.150* -0.508***
(0.108) (0.0919) (0.0899) (0.184)
Latino Seat Share -0.127 -0.0615 -0.0571 0.0492
(0.0834) (0.0703) (0.0673) (0.1000)
Urbanization -0.196** -0.112** -0.153* -0.0506
(0.0935) (0.0452) (0.0798) (0.113)
Democratic Vote Share 0.156** 0.172** 0.0924 0.809***
(0.0670) (0.0721) (0.0571) (0.131)
Seats -0.000393 -0.000177 -0.000643** 0.000184
(0.000291) (0.000150) (0.000261) (0.000303)
Lagged Efficiency Gap 0.339***
(0.0436)
Constant 0.120 0.0277 0.122* -0.320***
(0.0743) (0.0410) (0.0653) (0.100)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Standard Errors
Clustered
Plan State Plan Plan
2018] CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GERRYMANDERING 2151
Observations 786 786 745 436
District Plans 207 207 204 148
States 41 41 41 38
R-squared 0.643  0.690 0.707
Standard errors in paren-
theses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 2. Congressional Analysis
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Main
Random Ef-
fects
Lagged EG
Partisan
Bias
     
Unified Democratic 0.0324* 0.0316* 0.0222 0.0412*
(0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0243)
Unified Republican -0.0459*** -0.0472** -0.0421*** -0.0743***
(0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0133) (0.0190)
Commission -0.0365 -0.0349 -0.0318 -0.0724*
(0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0268) (0.0409)
Court 0.0280* 0.0201 0.0223* 0.00284
(0.0151) (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0163)
Black Seat Share -0.154* -0.151* -0.101 -0.0808
(0.0894) (0.0866) (0.0758) (0.147)
Latino Seat Share 0.0526 0.244 0.153 0.320
(0.178) (0.172) (0.143) (0.304)
Urbanization -0.364 0.0298 -0.264 0.239
(0.225) (0.0900) (0.207) (0.385)
Democratic Vote Share 0.105 0.146 -0.0157 1.104***
(0.112) (0.106) (0.0993) (0.197)
Seats -0.00275 -0.000964 -0.00295* -0.000556
(0.00207) (0.000730) (0.00165) (0.00285)
Lagged Efficiency Gap 0.234***
(0.0504)
Constant 0.102 -0.0797 0.140 -0.676***
(0.139) (0.0733) (0.124) (0.237)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Standard Errors
Clustered
Plan State Plan Plan
Observations 512 512 487 283
District Plans 136 136 133 112
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States 25 25 25 23
R-squared 0.456  0.504 0.573
Standard errors in paren-
theses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 3. Minority Representation Analysis
(1) (2)
VARIABLES State Houses
Congressional
Delegations
   
Unified Democratic 0.0363*** -0.00381
(0.0105) (0.0200)
Unified Republican -0.00654 -0.0384*
(0.0129) (0.0205)
Commission 0.0185 -0.0263
(0.0119) (0.0287)
Court -0.00124 0.0319**
(0.00829) (0.0150)
Black Seat Share -0.151 -0.348***
(0.115) (0.116)
Unified Democratic x Black Seat Share -0.0731 0.424***
(0.106) (0.152)
Unified Republican x Black Seat Share -0.209* -0.0776
(0.118) (0.187)
Latino Seat Share -0.124 0.0757
(0.0841) (0.170)
Urbanization -0.176* -0.415*
(0.0928) (0.227)
Democratic Vote Share 0.156** 0.107
(0.0680) (0.100)
Seats -0.000376 -0.00381*
(0.000284) (0.00206)
Constant 0.106 0.161
(0.0739) (0.142)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Effects Fixed Fixed
Standard Errors Clustered Plan Plan
Observations 786 512
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District Plans 207 136
States 41 25
R-squared 0.646 0.473
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4. Urbanization Analysis
(1) (2)
VARIABLES State Houses
Congressional
Delegations
   
Unified Democratic -8.30e-05 -0.112
(0.0335) (0.109)
Unified Republican -0.0301 0.00909
(0.0557) (0.125)
Commission 0.0226* -0.0254
(0.0128) (0.0320)
Court 0.00483 0.0313**
(0.00860) (0.0156)
Black Seat Share -0.213** -0.132
(0.107) (0.0894)
Latino Seat Share -0.115 0.0655
(0.0921) (0.177)
Urbanization -0.223** -0.562*
(0.0980) (0.285)
Unified Democratic x Urbanization 0.0481 0.189
(0.0447) (0.138)
Unified Republican x Urbanization 0.0137 -0.0726
(0.0717) (0.161)
Democratic Vote Share 0.165** 0.137
(0.0681) (0.113)
Seats -0.000401 -0.00218
(0.000300) (0.00219)
Constant 0.134* 0.225
(0.0755) (0.181)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Effects Fixed Fixed
Standard Errors Clustered Plan Plan
Observations 786 512
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District Plans 207 136
States 41 25
R-squared 0.644 0.462
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5. Congressional Representation Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Main
Lagged
DW-Nom-
inate
DW-Nom-
inate Av-
erage
Partisan
Bias
     
Efficiency Gap -1.405*** -1.331*** -0.673***
(0.137) (0.156) (0.0423)
Partisan Bias -1.607***
(0.188)
Democratic Vote Share -2.400*** -1.829*** -1.149*** -2.655***
(0.178) (0.196) (0.169) (0.582)
Lagged DW-Nominate Me-
dian
0.263***
(0.0538)
Constant 1.259*** 0.962*** 0.607*** 1.404***
(0.0937) (0.115) (0.0833) (0.270)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Standard Errors Clustered State State State State
Observations 464 439 464 261
States 25 24 25 23
R-squared 0.823 0.837 0.942 0.788
Standard errors in paren-
theses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
